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ABSTRACT 
 
Prior literature shows that analysts’ forecast estimates serve as a proxy for the markets’ and 
investors’ beliefs which are unobservable. For decades, analysts have generated forecasts for use 
in valuation models including future estimates of earnings and growth. Yet, only recently, analysts 
have begun to voluntarily provide cash flow per share forecasts at the same time they are 
producing earnings per share forecasts for firms they follow. This study addresses whether the 
tendency of analysts to issue cash flow per share forecasts, as a result of changes in the regulatory 
environment, affects forecast properties. By examining the time frame surrounding Regulation 
FD, the analysis provides evidence that both the mere existence and the relative measure of 
analysts’ cash flow per share forecasts differ in explaining analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. 
Specifically, the empirical results demonstrate that the relative value of analysts’ cash flow 
forecasts, the implied value of unexpected accruals, and cash flow forecast errors facilitate the 
reduction in analysts’ earnings forecast errors subsequent to the passage of Regulation FD. 
Further, the inverse relation between these analysts’ inputs and earnings forecast errors appear 
to be driven by firms with more accurate cash flow forecasts.  
 
Keywords:  cash flow forecasts; earnings forecasts; forecast error; Regulation FD  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
here has been a significant amount of research conducted which investigates analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and their economic consequences (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Ali et al. 1992; Cohen and 
Lys 2003; Kasznik and McNichols 2002). Analysts’ earnings forecasts provide expectations of a 
firm’s future prospects that play a role in firm valuation (Kasznik and McNichols 2002). More accurate forecasts are 
predicted to produce more accurate valuations. Ultimately, earnings expectations are predicted to be linked to both 
price and volume reactions when firms announce earnings (Abarbanell et al. 1995). However, if there are limitations 
and inefficiencies in analyst information processing, and the capital markets do not draw from appropriate sources, 
then prices may not fully reflect financial data (Beaver 2002). 
 
Recently, analysts have begun generating cash flow per share forecasts for firms, based on estimates of net 
cash flow from operations, at the same time they are forecasting earnings per share estimates. Givoly et al. (2009) 
state that cash flow forecasts have increased in frequency over the last decade from 2.5 percent in 1993 to 57.2 
percent in 2005. In spite of this increasing trend, it is still unclear what incentivizes analysts to provide these 
forecasts. Limited research has been conducted in this area, most presumably because these forecasts represent a 
relatively new measure. Some of the earliest research in the area has been based on the investor demand hypothesis. 
DeFond and Hung (2003) state that investors demand and analysts supply cash flow forecasts for firms with low 
quality earnings. As such, they find that firms with large accruals, less homogeneous accounting choices, high 
earnings volatility, high capital intensity, and poor financial strength are more inclined to have analysts disseminate 
cash flow forecasts. Likewise, in a similar international study, DeFond and Hung (2007) find that analysts generate 
cash flow forecasts for firms with poor anti-director rights and weak legal enforcement. 
 
T 
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While these prior studies have focused on the forecasting behavior of sell-side financial analysts, Wasley 
and Wu (2006) show that management of firms also recently began to voluntarily disclose their cash flow forecasts. 
They find that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news relating to future cash flow prospects. 
This disclosure enables management to meet investors’ demands for cash flow information and to show that the 
composition of earnings consists of a higher level of cash versus accruals. Thus, management believes that cash flow 
information provides investors with an indication that earnings management is mitigated in the organization.  
 
Although these prior studies examine firm-level financial characteristics shown to increase the potential for 
investor demand and, subsequently, analysts’ supply of cash flow information, studies have not directly tested the 
effects of regulation on the increasing trend of cash flow forecasts over time. Wasley and Wu (2006) speculate that 
one of the potential reasons for the increase in the issuance of management cash flow forecasts could be partly due 
to Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter, Reg FD). They report that the monthly frequency of management cash flow 
forecasts experienced a sharp increase in 2001 and 2002. However, they did not formally test the role of regulation 
and its effect on analysts’ forecasting abilities. Thus, this current study fills a void in the literature by empirically 
examining if government regulation plays a role in the propensity of sell-side analysts to issue these supplemental 
cash flow disclosures. Further, this study contributes to the literature by documenting how earnings forecast 
accuracy can vary based on the mere existence, the relative measure, and the accuracy of analysts’ cash flow 
forecasts.   
 
Regulation FD provides a natural setting to test for changes in the behavior of analysts’ forecasting skills. 
Barniv et al. (2009) show that government regulations such as Reg FD help to better explain analyst behavior 
patterns in terms of mitigating the attenuation between analysts’ stock recommendations and both residual income 
estimates and valuation heuristics, respectively. In August, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued 
Regulation Fair Disclosure Rule as part of the Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Regulation.  This ruling 
which targets security analysts states, “When an issuer or persons acting on its [the firm’s] behalf, disclose material, 
nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons, it must make public disclosure of that information by filing 
Form 8-K or through another comparable and widely distributed medium”(SEC 2001). Reg FD has been found to be 
effective at curtailing selective disclosure as evidenced by the findings that show analyst forecast dispersion and bias 
and low levels of analyst following are positively correlated with Reg FD (Bushee et al. 2004; Shane et al. 2001). 
This relation implies that during the Reg FD period, analysts had more difficulty in formulating forecasts because 
information was not selectively being provided to them by management (Irani and Karamanou 2003) and the 
absolute price-discovery impact of information generated by financial analysts was lower by 28% (Gintschela and 
Markov 2004). Overall, Reg FD “leveled the playing field” for investors and analysts. As a result, after this rule was 
enacted, researchers found that analysts were less accurate in their earnings forecasts and forecasting skills 
decreased (Aggarwal et al. 2005; Shane et al. 2001; Irani and Karamanou 2003; Gintschela and Markov 2004). 
Forecast errors are important to analyze because they are used to understand the properties of analysts’ information 
environments (Barron et al. 1998). However, whether the information contained in analysts’ cash flow forecasts is 
able to attenuate information asymmetry and reduce the difficulty in formulating earnings forecasts in the post-Reg 
FD period remains an empirical question.  
 
While prior research provides evidence on incentives to study cash flow forecasts, Givoly et al. (2009) note 
several deviations in their quality compared to earnings forecasts. They attribute these differences in part to 
accuracy, bias, efficiency, and benchmarking. On one hand, they state that cash flow forecasts exhibit a short 
history, which predisposes the forecasts to a longer learning curve, more limited availability, and less pre-
announcement management guidance than earnings forecasts. On the other hand, related to Brown et al. (1987), they 
find that analysts’ cash flow forecasts are more accurate than earnings forecasts based on a time series prediction 
model that regresses future cash flows on prior year’s net operating cash flows and changes in working capital 
accruals. Call et al. (2009) demonstrate that earnings forecasts are more accurate for firms for which analysts’ 
simultaneously issue cash flow forecasts. This increased accuracy can be attributed to the ability to gain a more 
coherent perspective of a firm’s earnings process by generating a complete set of financial statements.  
 
This current study is also motivated by the increased focus and attention given to cash flows at a time when 
earnings management is taking place. If analysts’ forecasts serve as a proxy for investors’ beliefs, and investors 
believe that earnings have the potential to be manipulated, then the inclusion of cash flow forecasts by analysts may 
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decrease this bias. Burgstahler and Eames (2003) reveal that analysts are fixated on earnings despite managers’ 
attempts to avoid losses or decreased earnings. Sloan (1996) states that investors underestimate the persistence of 
cash flows and overstate the persistence of accruals, leading to what is termed the accrual anomaly by fixating on 
the earnings component. McInnis and Collins (2011) find that earnings quality improves because cash flow forecasts 
implicitly provide a forecast of unexpected accruals. Call et al. (2009) provide evidence that, for firms for which 
analysts generate cash flow forecasts, analysts are able to correct for the underestimation of the cash and accrual 
components, thus reducing mispricing by as much as 30 percent.  
 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it validates prior research which 
provides evidence that analysts’ earnings forecast errors are positive and significantly higher in the post-Reg FD 
period due to deterioration in report informativeness (Francis et al. 2006). As a natural extension to the prior 
research conducted on Reg FD, the analysis specifically addresses whether a difference occurs between 1.) the mere 
existence or 2.) the relative measure of analysts’ cash flow forecasts and the corresponding reduction in analysts’ 
earnings forecast errors in the post-regulation period while also controlling for variables known to influence 
earnings forecast errors including size, profitability, volatility, and growth. I also examine whether the dissemination 
of these cash flow forecasts provides intrinsic unexpected accrual information capable of lowering forecast errors 
and whether analysts’ cash flow forecast errors improve analyst learning and forecasting skills. In sensitivity tests, I 
follow the suggestions in Givoly et al. (2009) by examining whether the results are driven by firms characterized by 
more accurate cash flow forecasts.  
 
The findings indicate that for firms for which analysts issue both earnings and cash flow forecasts, the mere 
existence of a cash flow forecast is not associated with mitigated forecast errors. However, for firms with cash flow 
forecasts, the relative measure or value of the forecast does provide supplemental information that attenuates 
earnings forecast error. These results have implications for disclosure research as, it is not merely the indication of 
disclosure that can affect transparency, but the quality of the report informativeness. Next, the value of the implied 
unexpected accruals that are defined as the difference between analysts’ earnings forecasts and cash flow forecasts 
are shown to be associated with lower forecast error. This finding suggests that the intrinsic information in 
unexpected accruals, which results from forecasting a complete set of financial statements, contains additional 
information content which facilitates a reduction in earnings forecast errors. Overall, this study contends that while 
analysts’ cash flow forecasts should not be used as a substitute for earnings expectations, the accompaniment of 
these cash flow forecasts in firm valuation could provide substantive benefits.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the research design and model development. The data sources and 
sample selection process are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results.  Section 6 presents 
additional sensitivity tests.  Lastly, Section 7 summarizes the results and conclusions. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
An extensive amount of research has been conducted on financial sell-side analysts’ research productivity 
and forecasting skills. Forecast performance plays a critical role in establishing analysts’ reputations (Jacob et al. 
1999) and analysts’ behavior patterns (Clement 1999). Analysts are motivated to provide accurate forecasts in order 
to increase compensation levels and career prospects, brokerage house and investment banking business, and firm 
market value. Pope (2003) notes that an important determinant of the quality of analysts’ forecasts is the disclosure 
level that influences forecast accuracy. Likewise, Schipper (1991) contends that analysts have an incentive to meet 
investors’ demands for value-relevant information. Investors and analysts are able to predict earnings more 
accurately using this available information. Therefore, the reliability or quality of accounting information will be 
more fundamental in improving analysts’ forecast performance when the disclosure level is high and contains 
greater information content.  
 
However, analysts need access to managements’ proprietary information in order to improve their forecast 
precision. For example, analysts contribute greater effort in following firms with intangible assets and whose value 
is less well-captured by accounting applications (Barth et al. 2001). Prior to Reg FD, analysts were privy to 
confidential information supplied by management that was not ordinarily disseminated to the public. In order to 
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remain on favorable terms with management to ensure obtaining this private information, analysts optimistically 
biased forecasts and “walked down” estimates closer to the earnings announcement date (Richardson et al. 2004). 
Both Lim (2001) and Das et al. (1998) present empirical evidence that reveals that, in general, analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are more optimistically biased when earnings are less predictable and when the forecast task is more 
complex. However, Eames and Glover (2003) find no evidence of biased forecasts after controlling for the level of 
earnings. Mikhail et al. (2003) shows that more experienced analysts tend to issue more pessimistic forecasts rather 
than optimistic forecasts. In other words, analysts tend to underreact to prior earnings surprises less as they gain 
more firm-specific experience.  
 
Since research has indicated that most analysts’ forecasts are optimistic, there could be an inherent bias 
related to the underwriting of the firm’s securities issue. Analysts’ forecast errors have also been shown to be 
serially correlated and underestimate the persistence of earnings (Ali et al. 1992; Abarbanell and Bernard 1992). 
However, analysts’ earnings forecasts do not reflect all information. Cross-sectional determinants of analysts’ 
forecast revisions and whether the informativeness of analysts’ reports is due to the markets’ over or underreaction 
to analysts’ reports is studied in Frankel et al. (2006).  Investors are shown to place decreasing weights on their prior 
beliefs and increasing weights on the accuracy of the forecast record (Chen et al. 2005). Investors’ reactions to 
forecast news are also found to be increasing in the product of the accuracy and length of the analyst forecast record.   
 
Due to the many corporate accounting scandals that have taken place, the financial press and investors have 
frequently expressed suspicions about the economic justification of earnings based on accrual accounting and have 
suggested the use of cash flows to help validate the information in earnings (Garrod and Hadi 1998). However, cash 
flow per share and cash flow per share forecasts are not a required component of GAAP financial statements 
(McEnroe 1996). Penman (2004) suggests that investors and financial intermediaries find cash flows useful in 
evaluating earnings quality and in gauging whether earnings are likely to contain misstatements. Prior research finds 
that past earnings forecasts may be an incomplete signal of future results (Abarbanell 1991). Earnings can include 
managers’ biased estimates of future firm actions which can inherently be more susceptible to manipulation than 
cash flows. Certain accruals that encompass earnings may have transitory components that do not persist in the 
future (Allen and Cote 2005). Cash flows have been found to be the permanent component of earnings and have 
greater persistence than accruals in estimating future cash flows.  Ali et al. (1992), Sloan (1996), and Barth et al. 
(2001) indicate that the cash flow component is the stronger indicator of future firm performance.   
 
Conversely, Dechow et al. (1998) model earnings, cash flows, and accruals and note that their findings 
imply that, depending on the operating cash cycle, earnings are a better predictor of operating cash flows than 
current operating cash flows. Black (1998) also notes that earnings have been found to be more value relevant than 
operating, investing, or financing cash flows in mature life-cycle stages. However, Barth et al. (2001) extends this 
framework and finds aggregate operating cash flows and accrual components have significant predictive ability for 
future operating cash flows. As such, she argues that cash flow prediction is fundamental to assessing firm value.  
 
The relevance of using cash flow forecasts deals with the notion that accounting consists of both historical 
costs and accrual-based accounting estimates. It is often acknowledged that cash flow measures may be harder to 
manipulate than the earnings component and may provide incremental value. Not only does cash flow measure how 
efficiently cash is used, but it can serve as a deciding factor in whether to pursue a merger, extend operations 
globally, or introduce a new product line (Gamble 2005). Therefore, a general expansion of economic activity has 
elevated the need for cash flow transparency. An increase in merger and acquisition activity and compliance 
requirements due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) have also required firms to be more cognizant of their future 
cash flow positions. While there has been limited research conducted which examines capital market theory relating 
to analysts’ cash flow forecasts, DeFond and Hung (2003) examine the association between stock returns and cash 
flows. Stock return distributions centered on the earnings announcement date for firms with cash flow forecasts are 
positively related to cash flow forecast errors, but not earnings forecast errors. This finding suggests that investors 
demand cash flow forecasts when earnings are perceived as less useful in securities valuation.   
 
Opponents of Reg FD have argued that this rule would have a negative effect on earnings forecasts by 
decreasing the quantity and quality of publicly available information.  According to prior research, the job of 
predicting earnings has become harder under the passage of Reg FD because the rules do not permit companies to 
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make private disclosures to analysts without a corresponding public announcement, conference call, or press release. 
Research has shown that following the post-Reg FD period, there is a decrease in analyst forecast quality as 
evidenced by a decrease in analyst following and an increase in forecast dispersion (Irani and Karamanou, 2003). 
This effect is significantly larger for early forecasts rather than for later forecasts and for smaller companies than for 
larger companies (Agrawal et al. 2006). Moreover, analysts with high unexplained levels of forecast accuracy are 
not able to sustain these levels in the post-Reg FD period (Findlay and Mathew 2006). Accordingly, if Reg FD is 
successful at curtailing selective disclosure, it would be expected that there would be a positive relation between the 
post-Regulation FD period and analysts’ earnings forecast errors as the forecasting task becomes more complicated 
and the guesswork grows.  
 
Conversely, although Reg FD has reduced the discussions between managers and analysts, the percentage 
of earnings announcements that meet or beat analysts’ expectations has not decreased, and market reactions to 
earnings announcements are reduced (Shane et al. 2001). Research has also shown that after implementation of Reg 
FD, the information contained in stock prices prior to earnings announcements were more efficient as evidenced by 
smaller differences between the pre- and post-announcement stock prices. For example, (Heflin et al. 2003) found 
mixed or weak evidence in the relation between analyst earnings forecast errors and dispersion during the Reg FD 
period.  
 
Since capital markets are concerned with future performance levels more so than past performance, 
analysts’ cash flow forecasts may provide additional information content and disclosure in predicting future earnings 
and increasing forecast accuracy. Healy et al. (1999) demonstrate a negative relation between sustained increases in 
disclosure and forecast dispersion.  However, deterioration in information content could decrease forecast accuracy. 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) illustrate that low-rated disclosure quality by analysts results in higher forecast 
dispersion. Barron et al. (1999) find similar evidence with regard to low-rated disclosure quality by the SEC.  
 
Analysts do not always incorporate earnings into their recommendations which are consistent with present 
value models, but rather, they rely on valuation heuristics. Bradshaw (2004) used analysts’ forecast errors as inputs 
to the residual income valuation model. Yet, the valuations were not able to explain stock recommendations. These 
findings suggest that analysts use other types of valuation methods. After Reg FD, management of firms were found 
to issue more voluntary, earnings-related disclosures, which are consistent with firms substituting voluntary, public 
disclosures to at least partially offset reductions in information flows for analysts. Likewise, according to Mohanram 
and Sunder (2006), analysts were found to increase the level of information obtained from their own private 
discovery of idiosyncratic information. Their finding suggests that analysts went to greater lengths to improve their 
precision of information and to increase the accuracy of their forecasts after the passage of Reg FD. Thus, it remains 
an empirical question if analysts use cash flow forecasts as an effective means of increasing their forecasting skills 
in the post-Reg FD environment.  
 
Prior research also indicates that during conference calls, analysts gained privileged knowledge on cash 
flow projections. Management treated this material information as an attraction in gaining favor with certain 
analysts. If Reg FD decreases the quality of earnings, analysts may be more inclined to generate cash flow forecasts 
to compensate for the increase in analysts’ forecast errors and the widening of analysts’ forecast dispersion in 
regards to earnings. Overall, it is reasonable to believe that analysts are more apt to generate cash flow forecasts in 
order to help overcome inefficiencies that may limit earnings’ usefulness. It could be expected that cash flow 
forecasts provide additional disclosure on the quality of firm performance due to managers’ attempts to avoid losses 
or decreased earnings. If cash flows are deemed to provide supplemental earnings information that benefits market 
participants, then there should be an inverse relation between the Reg FD period and analysts’ cash flow forecasts. 
Call et al. (2009) model cash flow forecasts using an indicator variable that represents the existence of a cash flow 
forecast. This specification is important to model because only the sheer existence of a cash flow forecast could 
attract and influence investors regardless of its relative accuracy. Therefore, first I examine the mere existence of a 
cash flow forecast and test the following hypothesis. All hypotheses which follow are stated in their alternate form.  
 
H1: Analysts’ earnings per share forecast errors are attenuated for firms based on the mere existence of cash 
flow forecasts issued by analysts in the post-Regulation FD period.  
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However, Givoly et al. (2009) imply that differences in the signaling value of cash flow forecasts could 
occur due to not only the mere existence of a cash flow forecast but the relative value of the forecasted measure. 
Recall that Givoly et al. (2009) question the accuracy of analysts’ cash flow forecasts as opposed to the improved 
accuracy of earnings forecasts, when accompanied by a cash flow forecast, as documented in Call et al. (2009).  
Givoly et al. (2009) conduct their analysis using the relative cash flow forecast values.  The relative value of cash 
flow forecasts may take into account more qualitative aspects over time and may contain more information content 
in terms of disclosure. Following this line of reasoning, I test the following hypothesis:  
 
H2: Analysts’ earnings per share forecast errors are attenuated for firms based on the relative measurement of 
cash flow forecasts issued by analysts in the post-Regulation FD period.  
 
Melendez et al. (2009) state that if firms want to manage earnings, they are more likely to manipulate 
accruals rather than cash flows. The difference between analysts’ earnings forecasts and cash flow forecasts 
automatically provides an intrinsic forecast of unexpected accruals since earnings consist of an accrual and a cash 
flow component. Call et al. (2009) provide evidence that for firms for which analysts disseminate cash flow 
forecasts, analysts and investors place more weight on the cash flow component than the accrual component, thus 
reducing accrual mispricing. Therefore, it is expected that improvements in forecasts of accruals due to assessing 
cash flow forecasts could provide additional information to analysts in the Post-Reg FD period that can increase 
forecast accuracy. As such, the following hypothesis is stated in alternate form: 
 
H3: Analysts’ earnings per share forecast errors are attenuated for firms based on the information contained in 
the intrinsic unexpected accruals forecast for firms with cash flow forecasts issued by analysts in the post-
Regulation FD period.  
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
As stated, forecast errors (inverse of analyst accuracy and precision) are often a proxy for the magnitude of 
difficulty in forecasting earnings and are a reflection of analyst aptitude. To empirically test the above hypotheses, I 
define analyst earnings per share forecast error. For skewed distributions such as earnings, the mean and the median 
are likely to be different. Gu and Wu (2003) find that the skewness of earnings distributions affects the bias in 
means which suggests that analysts may be apparently optimistic. Absolute analysts forecast error is described by 
the following equation: 
 
  1/  itititit PFEPSAEPSAFE  
Where: 
 
AEPSit is the reported consensus annual earnings per share for firm i for period t. FEPSit is the median 
analyst earnings per share forecast for firm i for period t. Pit-1 is the price of the stock at the beginning of the fiscal 
period t for firm i.     
 
Irani and Karamanou (2003) and Heflin et al. (2003) among others model the determinants of dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and analyst following both before and after the Reg FD environment. Following this 
methodology, for all firms with analysts’ earnings per share forecasts, I regress analyst forecast error on the Reg FD 
variable along with several exogenous control variables known to be associated with earnings forecast error. Using  
a pooled, cross-sectional, time series regression model, I assess whether the Reg FD period is associated with higher 
earnings forecast errors as represented in regression Model (1).  
 
itititititit RETSTDEPSSTDLOSSSIZEFDAFE 54321    
 ititit
GROWTHSURPRISE  
 716
 (1) 
 
All of the variables used in the models and equations are defined in Appendix A. 
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Next, Model (1) is extended by interacting the Reg FD variable with the existence of a cash flow forecast 
variable, CFDit-1, at the beginning of the period for all firms with analysts’ earnings per share forecasts. Firms for 
which analysts provide a cash flow forecasts are coded as 1 and 0 for firms followed by analysts without cash flow 
forecasts.  In Model (2) below, it is expected that the variable FDit*CFDit-1 will be negative, indicating that the mere 
existence of a cash flow forecast in the post-Reg FD period versus the pre-Reg FD period is associated with 
attenuated forecast errors.  
 
        ititititititit
LOSSSIZECFDFDCFDFDAFE 5413121 *     
                        ititititit
GROWTHSURPRISERETSTDEPSSTD    91876  (2) 
 
Model (3) takes into consideration the Reg FD variable based on the relative measure of the cash flow 
forecast variable. It is expected that the variable FDit*FCPSit-1  will be negative also, indicating that the relative 
value of a cash flow forecast in the post-Reg FD period versus the pre-Reg FD period is associated with attenuated 
forecast errors.  Model (3) is illustrated below. 
 
 
        ititititititit
LOSSSIZEFCPSFDFCPSFDAFE 541321 *     
                    ititititit
GROWTHSURPRISERETSTDEPSSTD    91876  (3) 
 
Lastly, I account for the interaction of the Reg FD variable with the implied forecast of unexpected accruals 
variable in Model (4). It is expected that the variable FDit*ACCFORCit-1 will also be negative, indicating that the 
implied forecast of unexpected accruals provides additional information content as a result of the generation of cash 
flow forecasts by analysts which aids in lower forecast errors (e.g., higher forecast accuracy) in the post-Reg FD 
period versus the pre-Reg FD period . This is modeled below as:  
 
 
        ititititititit
LOSSSIZEACCFORCFDACCFORCFDAFE 541321 *     
                      ititititit
GROWTHSURPRISERETSTDEPSSTD    91876                          (4) 
 
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
Several data sources are used to acquire the information used in the analysis. First, the Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail History and Summary files for the period 1993 through 2007 were used to 
acquire the list of firms having analyst earnings, stock price, common shares outstanding, and cash flow data. 
Additional data was obtained from the Research Insight Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT annual industrial and 
research files. This time period is chosen because I/B/E/S first began accumulating data on analysts’ cash flow 
forecasts in 1993. Additionally, the year 2000 for the FDit variable is excluded from the sample as this year 
represents the transition period. I delete firms with standard industrial classification codes of 6000-6999 as these 
represent firms in regulated industries that may be subject to additional reporting requirements. Table 1 provides the 
descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. The mean analyst earnings per share forecast error, AFEit, is 
0.0341. Analyst forecast errors appear to decrease in the post-FD period which exhibit a mean of 0.0297. More cash 
flow forecasts appear to be generated by analysts in the post-Reg FD period. The mean cash flow indicator variable, 
CFDit-1 is 0.0565 in the pre-Reg FD period and 0.4812 in the post-Reg FD period. On average, it also appears that 
earnings surprises and earnings and stock return volatility are increasing in the post-FD period which could also 
explain analysts’ inclinations to estimate cash flow forecasts. Overall, Table 1 indicates significant differences 
between the variables in the study in the pre- versus post-Reg FD period.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Pre-and Post-Reg FD Periods 
 Pre-Reg FD Period 
(1994 – 1999) 
Post-Reg FD Period 
(2001 – 2007) 
 
Difference 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Std. 
Dev 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Std. 
Dev 
 
t-stat 
 
Wilcoxon Z 
AFEit 0.0341 0.007 0.0745 0.0297 0.0098 0.0859 -11.03*** 10.0973*** 
CFDit-1 0.0565 0.0000 0.2308 0.4812 0.0000 0.4997 -89.01*** -75.1143*** 
FCPSit-1 2.3480 1.7900 2.5289 2.3964 2.0500 6.5504 -1.63* -2.4268*** 
SIZEit 7.2885 6.3292 1.7296 7.9476 6.8417 1.5940 -17.90*** 17.7259*** 
LOSSit 0.1599 0.0000 0.3670 0.1282 0.0000 0.3343 -15.72*** -15.4569*** 
EPSSTDit 0.2513 0.0400 1.3295 0.3643 0.0500 10.7753 0.99 -15.5007*** 
RETSTDit 0.4352 0.4491 0.1724 0.5247 0.4640 0.3704 -2.40** -4.2856*** 
SURPRISEit-1 0.0272 0.0126 0.0332 0.0365 0.0150 0.1948 -2.73*** -8.0744*** 
GROWTHit 0.0007 0.0011 0.0034 -0.0101 0.0007 0.3361 3.42*** 11.9962*** 
***,**,* indicates differences in the mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon Rank-Sum) tests between the Pre-and Post-Reg 
FD period at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels based on two-tailed tests, respectively. 
 
 
 Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the variables presented. The Pearson correlation coefficients are 
reported above the diagonal for firms (post-Reg FD period) and below the diagonal for firms (pre-Reg-FD period). 
However, in order to control for other mitigating factors that could affect analysts’ earnings forecast errors, ordinary 
least squares regressions were conducted using panel data.   
 
 
Table 2 
Pearson Correlations for the Pre-and Post-Reg FD Period 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1. AFEit - -0.071 0.002 -0.341 0.492 0.140 0.131 0.187 0.007 
2. CFDit-1 0.104 - -0.001 0.211 -0.097 -0.045 -0.037 -0.025 0.028 
3. FCPSit-1 0.043 0.078 - 0.076 -0.081 -0.207 -0.087 -0.015 -0.038 
4. SIZEit -0.317 -0.019 0.207 - -0.340 -0.049 -0.090 -0.083 -0.057 
5. LOSSit 0.433 0.094 -0.108 -0.250 - 0.066 0.206 0.175 0.011 
6. EPSSTDit 0.032 -0.024 -0.181 -.0907 0.166 - 0.030 0.023 0.000 
7. RETSTDit 0.312 0.089 -0.199 -0.286 0.322 0.103 - 0.076 0.002 
8. SURPRISEit-1 0.183 0.148 -0.024 -0.220 0.108 0.084 0.208 - 0.005 
9. GROWTHit -0.206 0.009 -0.130 0.034 -0.163 0.017 0.048 -0.068 - 
Pearson Correlation coefficients are reported above the diagonal for the Pre-Reg FD period and correlations for the Post-Reg 
FD Period are reported below the line. Amounts in bold are significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the relations between analysts’ earnings forecast errors and analysts’ cash 
flow forecasts using several different variables to represent the inputs of cash flow forecasts. In column 3, Model 
(1), analysts’ earnings per share forecast errors are regressed on the Reg FD Period, the main variable of interest, 
and several control variables used in extant research. The adjusted R
2
 of the model is 27.95%. The coefficient FDit is 
positive and significant at the α = 0.01 level which indicates that Reg FD was successful at selective disclosure. This 
relation supports prior research that shows analysts have more difficulty in formulating forecasts because 
information was not being privately provided to them by management (Irani and Karamanou 2003). An increase in 
forecast errors indicates that analysts are less accurate in predicting earnings because of poorer forecasting skills in 
the post-Reg FD period compared to the pre-Reg FD period when analysts had closer ties to management and 
proprietary information.    
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In column 4, Model (2), the variable that represents the mere existence of a cash flow forecast in the post-
Reg FD period is FDt*CFDt-1. The coefficient is 0.0063 and is not significant.  The mere presence of a cash flow 
forecast is not associated with reduced earnings forecast errors. As a result H1 is not supported.  This finding also 
has ramifications for future studies that use cash flow forecast indicator variables in their analysis and supports the 
contentions expressed regarding the quality of analysts’ cash flow forecasts by Givoly et al. (2009). Furthermore, 
this finding suggests that it is not merely the formulation of a cash flow forecast by analysts’ in the post-Reg FD 
period that affects forecast accuracy.  
 
Next, in column 5, we find support for H2, in that Model (3) illustrates that the relative value of the cash 
flow forecasts generated by analysts is associated with more reduced forecast errors.  The variable of interest is 
FDt*FCPSt-1 and the coefficient, -0.0035, is negative and significant at the 0.05 level. This finding has implications 
for disclosure in that the discovery of knowledge and research based on idiosyncratic information generated by 
analysts are transferred to cash flow reports and factors into their forecasting skill set, leading to more accurate 
earnings forecasts. 
 
Model (4), column 5, is used to determine whether the implied value of forecasted unexpected accruals 
represents additional information precision that can reduce earnings forecast errors. The variable FDit*ACCFCt-1 has 
a coefficient of -0.2175 and is negative and significant at the 0.01 level. This relation supports H3 and shows that 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors are attenuated for firms based on the information contained in this intrinsic 
unexpected accruals forecasts for firms with cash flow forecasts issued by analysts in the post-Reg FD period. This 
finding also implies that if cash flow forecasts were merely an extrapolation of current earnings forecasts and 
changes in working capital accruals, then the slope coefficients would not be significantly different from zero and 
would not be significantly associated with decreased earnings forecast errors.  
 
VI. ADDITIONAL SENSITIVITY TESTS 
 
I also consider the effect of the beginning period analysts’ cash flow forecast errors on earnings forecast 
error. Analyst cash flow forecast errors are measured as the difference between actual cash flow per share reported 
by I/B/E/S and analysts’ forecasted cash flow per share. However, consistent with Givoly et al. (2009), I/B/E/S has 
not consistently provided actual cash flow per share information which results in missing values for many firms. 
Since actual cash flow values are required to compute cash flow forecast error, following Givoly et al. (2009), I use 
cash flow from operating activities from COMPUSTAT scaled by the number of common shares outstanding. If 
common shares outstanding is not available from I/B/E/S, COMPUSTAT values are used.  Since cash flow forecasts 
represent a relatively new measure with a shorter time series history, these forecasts lack the extensive research 
stream provided by earnings studies. However, cash flow forecast errors may reveal additional information to 
analysts about the firm that could be used to aid in more accurate earnings forecasts. Thus, it would be expected that 
there would be a negative relation between analysts’ cash flow forecasts and earnings forecasts in the post-Reg FD 
period. Model (5) in Table 3 illustrates that cash flow forecast errors mitigate analysts’ earnings forecast errors. This 
relation suggests that analysts are able to learn from their cash flow forecasts errors and these inputs aid in helping 
analysts to forecast better earnings.  
 
Additionally, Givoly et al. (2009) suggest some potential inherent quality limitations regarding the 
accuracy and bias of analysts’ cash flow forecasts compared to earnings forecasts. To account for this likelihood, a 
variable indicator scheme is used where cash flow forecast errors that fall below the median are categorized as 1 for 
more accurate forecasts, and those above the median are categorized as 0 for less accurate forecasts. Table 3, Model 
(6), illustrates the regression based on more accurate forecasts only. The regression model for less accurate forecasts 
is not illustrated. The coefficient for FDt*FCPSt-1 is -0.0041 and is significant at the 0.05 level. This finding 
indicates that analysts’ earnings per share forecast errors are attenuated for firms based on the relative measurement 
of cash flow forecasts issued by analysts in the post-Reg FD period. However, this result appears to be driven by 
firms with more accurate cash flow forecasts.  
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Table 3 
Relation Between Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors And Analysts’ Cash Flow Forecasts  
Dependent variable = AFEit 
 
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
Model (1) 
 
Model (2) 
 
Model (3) 
 
Model (4) 
 
Model (5)  
 
Model (6)a 
Intercept na 0.0768*** 
(18.44) 
0.0839*** 
(19.21) 
0.0795*** 
(8.74) 
0.0492*** 
(5.14) 
0.0532*** 
(5.61) 
0.1150*** 
(6.49) 
FDit + 0.0047*** 
(4.22) 
-0.0022 
(-1.46) 
0.0127** 
(2.34) 
0.0191*** 
(4.03) 
0.0037 
(0.92) 
0.0102* 
(1.67) 
CFDit-1 na  0.0095*** 
(2.89) 
    
FDit*CFDit-1 -  0.0063 
(1.67) 
    
FCPSit-1 na   0.0045*** 
(2.75) 
  0.0045** 
(2.27) 
FDit*FCPSit-1 -   -0.0035** 
(-2.10) 
  -0.0041** 
(-2.07) 
SIZEit na -0.0093*** 
(-19.19) 
-0.0105*** 
(-19.68) 
-0.0105*** 
(-9.56) 
-0.0074*** 
(-8.47) 
-0.0068*** 
(-5.99) 
-0.0152*** 
(-6.36) 
LOSSit + 0.0836*** 
(26.03) 
0.0838*** 
(26.14) 
0.0995*** 
(13.63) 
0.0824*** 
(13.09) 
0.0731 
(10.14)*** 
0.0936*** 
(8.81) 
EPSSTDit + 0.0004 
(1.60) 
0.0004 
(1.59) 
0.0009*** 
(4.22) 
0.0009*** 
(2.95) 
0.0529*** 
(4.71) 
0.0007*** 
(6.57) 
RETSTDit + 0.0052 
(1.50) 
0.0059* 
(1.76) 
0.0077* 
(1.86) 
0.0073 
(1.16) 
0.0017 
(0.48) 
0.008 
(0.08) 
SURPRISEit-1 + 0.0516*** 
(3.35) 
0.0509*** 
(3.32) 
0.0457* 
(1.71) 
0.0431* 
(1.73) 
0.0621** 
(2.09) 
0.0954*** 
(2.90) 
GROWTHit - -0.0047*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.0046*** 
(-2.43) 
-0.0015 
(-1.60) 
-0.0021** 
(-2.32) 
0.0003 
(0.20) 
-0.0033*** 
(-2.54) 
CFFEit-1 na     0.1177*** 
(4.20) 
 
FDt*CFFEit-1 -     -.0001*** 
(-4.21) 
 
ACCFCit-1 na    0.2317*** 
(3.88) 
  
FDt*ACCFDit-1 -    -0.2175*** 
(-3.64) 
  
       
Adjusted R2  0.2795 0.2848 0.2964 0.3294 0.3862 0.3019 
n  13,800 13,800 4,242 5,088 3,354 1,410 
Clustered Std. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-values are reported below the coefficient. 
p-values are based on two-tailed tests. 
***,**,*   denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively 
aChow F-test statistic is 13.49 and is significant at 0.01 level. 
 
 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Recently, analysts have begun to voluntarily provide cash flow per share forecasts for firms they are 
following at the same time they are producing earnings per share estimates. While very few studies have 
investigated the role of analysts’ cash flow forecasts, some prior studies have suggested that investors demand 
additional cash flow information and financial analysts, as information intermediaries, react to this demand by 
supplementing their earnings forecasts with cash flow forecasts.   
 
This study fills a void in the literature by empirically examining if government regulation plays a role in the 
inclination of sell-side analysts to issue cash flow forecasts by examining the time frame surrounding Regulation 
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Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). Prior research finds that Reg FD is positively associated with the widening of forecast 
dispersion by barring selective disclosure of information by management to analysts. I investigate whether analysts 
are more likely to generate cash flow forecasts in order to supplement the reduction in management’s private 
information and the resulting forecasting complexity that arises in the post-Reg FD period in order to help overcome 
the effects that may hinder their forecasting ability when forming earnings estimates. 
 
The analysis provides evidence that both the mere existence and the relative measure of analysts’ cash flow 
per share forecasts differ in explaining the attenuation of analysts’ earnings per share forecast errors. Specifically, 
the relative value of analysts’ cash flow forecasts, the information in intrinsic unexpected accruals, and cash flow 
forecast errors aid in reducing analysts’ earnings forecast errors after Reg FD. Overall, this study contends that while 
analysts’ cash flow forecasts should not be used solely as a substitute for earnings expectations, the inclusion of 
these cash flow forecasts for firm valuation could provide substantive benefits. Further, due to some inherent quality 
limitations of analysts’ cash flow forecasts due to their relatively short time series history and consensus following, 
in additional sensitivity tests, I find that the ability of the relative value of analysts’ cash flow forecasts to mitigate 
earnings forecasts errors in the post-Reg FD period appears to be driven by firms with more accurate cash flow 
forecasts.  
 
The results of this study also have implications for analysts, regulators, academics, and policy-makers in 
support of more transparent disclosures of cash flow reporting information in the financial statements, especially as 
analysts’ cash flow forecasts gain more prominence and following.  
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Appendix A 
 
Definitions Of Variable Measures 
AFEit = Analyst consensus earnings forecast error measured by the absolute value of actual earnings per share less 
the median forecasted earnings per share deflated by beginning of the fiscal year price.  
FDit = Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for years after 2001, 0 for years prior to 2000.  The year 2000 
is excluded from the analysis since Regulation FD became effective on October 23, 2000.  
CFDit-1 = Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms for which analysts had issued a cash flow forecast, 0 
otherwise. This variable represents the mere existence of the generation of a cash flow forecast.  
FDt* CFDit-1 = Interaction variable which measures the existence of a cash flow forecast in the Post-Reg FD period. 
FCPSit-1 = Relative value of the consensus cash flow forecast supplied by analysts at the beginning of the period. 
FDt* FCPSit-1 = Interaction variable which measures the relative value of the consensus cash flow forecast supplied by 
analysts in the post-Reg FD period. 
SIZEit = Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Size is negatively related to optimistic 
forecast bias (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Das et al. 1998). Firm size has been used in prior research as 
a proxy for the amount of prior information available about a firm.  Bhushan (1989) and Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) find size to be positively associated with analyst following and analyst forecast 
accuracy.   
LOSSit = Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the reported earnings per share is negative, 0 otherwise. 
Previous research finds it is difficult to forecast earnings for firms with losses.  Brown (2001) find 
analysts’ earnings forecasts of firms that are experiencing losses are often less accurate due to increased 
difficulty of estimating losses stemming from earnings management.  
EPSSTDit = Standard deviation of actual EPS reported by I/B/E/S. Firms with volatile earnings are more prone to 
larger forecast errors. 
RETSTDit = Standard deviation of stock return reported by I/B/E/S.  Firms with more volatile stock returns are prone 
to larger forecast errors.  
SURPRISEit-1 = Absolute value of the unexpected earnings surprise measured as the annual change in earnings per share 
scaled by beginning of the period price. This is a standardized random walk variable that measures the 
variability or surprise in earnings at the beginning of the year. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that larger 
earnings surprises are related to less accurate forecasts. 
GROWTHit = Growth measured as the annual percentage changes in sales. Dechow and Sloan (1997) find that forecast 
accuracy is biased and related to measures of growth. In regards to Reg FD, Gintschela and Markov 
(2004) report that analysts are impacted by the amount of information they receive from growth firms for 
which they are privy to more management information. During the post-Reg FD period, analysts tended 
to issue more forecasts for growth companies versus value companies.  
ACCFORCit-1 = I/B/E/S reported earnings per share forecast less the cash flow per share forecast at the beginning of the 
year. This measure represents analysts’ intrinsic accruals forecast or unexpected accruals.  
CFFEit-1 = Analyst consensus cash flow forecast error measured by the absolute value of the actual cash flow per 
share less the median forecasted cash flow per share deflated by beginning of the fiscal year price. 
Following Givoly et al. (2009), for firms with missing actual cash flow information form I/B/E/S, net 
cash from operating activities scaled by the number of shares of common stock outstanding was used 
from COMPUSTAT.  
 
 
